Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Institutional Economics Année : 2025

Jaurès’s The New Army (1911): The Organisation of Democratic Institutions as War Prevention

Résumé

The canonical reading of Jaurès’s L’Armée nouvelle presents this work as an outdated reflection on the establishment of a socialist society supervised by intermediary bodies whose military training would be a major asset. Our reading goes beyond this historically situated approach to Jaurès’s book. We show that The New Army is not just a response to the General Staff, even less a “theorisation” of the transition to socialism, but that its aim is to rehabilitate the founding principles of democratic institutions (ancient and modern), which rest on the constitution of an army of citizens: The “proletarian-soldier” of Jaurès is none other than the “farmer-soldier” of the ancient city and of Year 2 of the French Revolutionary calendar, transposed to the Industrial Age. Relying on a game-theoretical model, we highlight that this defence of democratic institutions is backed by a discourse of the economics of war prevention in terms of self-protection.

HAL

Est une version de hal-04425659 Preprint Marcel Parent, Antoine Parent, Pierre-Charles Pradier, Laurent Gauthier. Jaurès's The New Army (1911) as a Model of Strategic War Prevention. 2024. ⟨hal-04425659⟩

Dates et versions

hal-05018041 , version 1 (02-04-2025)

Identifiants

Citer

Marcel Parent, Antoine Parent, Pierre-Charles Pradier, Laurent Gauthier. Jaurès’s The New Army (1911): The Organisation of Democratic Institutions as War Prevention. Journal of Institutional Economics, 2025, 21 (e23), pp.1-19. ⟨10.1017/S174413742500013X⟩. ⟨hal-05018041⟩
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