A Formal Account of Bullshit Jobs
Résumé
"Bullshit jobs" were introduced by anthropologist David Graeber (2018): well paid jobs perceived as useless by those holding them and raising questions about the legitimacy and social meaning of work. Empirical studies in sociology and economics have shown that a large share of all jobs may be qualified as bullshit jobs according to Graeber's definition (10-40%). However, this phenomenon has not been given a formal theoretical account: Graeber's work has not been addressed by economists. Our purpose is to provide a formal explanation for why such jobs can arise inside organizations. Our central hypothesis is that when managers are incentivized to extend the wage bill, organizations may sustain well-paid positions that are net negatives. We propose a simple model of high- and low-skill labor, combined with middle management's specific incentives. We show that a pooling equilibrium exists where high-skill jobs squander resources and become bullshit jobs. Within the model, the hypothesis is confirmed: the specified incentive structure is sufficient to produce bullshit jobs. Our formal account of bullshit jobs frames them as an organizational cost, which links anthropological insights with formal modeling in the sociology of work.
